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Abstract—Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) comprises of nodes
with small and limited resources including power and memory
capacity. We propose the use of DTN as an alternate means of
communication for the dissemination of emergency information
in a post-disaster evacuation operation. We investigate the perfor-
mance of DTN in providing emergency communication support
services under packet dropping attacks. We consider internally
motivated attacks where the nodes that are part of the emergency
rescue team are compromised with malicious behaviours thereby
dropping packets to disrupt the message dissemination during the
evacuation operation. A way to mitigating malicious behaviour
and improve network performance of DTN is to use incentives in
exchanging information between nodes. Unlike existing schemes,
we consider the Basic Watchdog Detection System which detects
and acts against misbehaving nodes to reduce their overall impact
on the network performance. We design a Collaborative Trust
Management Scheme (CTMS) which is based on the Bayesian
detection watchdog approach to detect selfish and malicious
behaviour in DTN nodes. We have evaluated our proposed CTMS
through extensive simulations and compared our results with
the other existing schemes. Our evaluations show that the use
of adequate collaborative strategies between well behaved nodes
could improve the performance of Watchdog schemes taking into
account the delivery ratio, routing cost and the message delay
from the source node to the destination node.
Index Terms—Disaster, Blackhole, Grayhole, DTN, Trust,
Emergency
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of a disaster, the regular communication
services are disrupted due to the breakdown or destruction of
communication infrastructures and power outages [1]. When
a major disaster strikes such as the recent earthquake experi-
enced in Nepal and the Hurricane Katrina, the communication
infrastructure can remain incapacitated for weeks. There is
need to re-establish communication in these areas to support
the disaster rescue and relief operations [2]. In man-made
disasters, there are intentional destruction of telecommunica-
tion infrastructures to disrupt communication in these areas.
Over 530 base stations were damaged in Nigeria, about three
hundred and eighty were destroyed by flood and one hundred
and fifty were damaged by Boko Haram terrorist group [3].
Similarly, the Taliban group in Afghanistan also destroyed
over fifty telecommunication masts using explosive devices
[4]. The targeting of telecommunication infrastructure by Boko
Haram in Nigeria followed the same strategic trajectory as the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networks
(DTNs) can be used in man-made or natural disaster stricken
areas with communication infrastructure breakdown or power
outages. DTN has been developed as a solution to wireless
networks experiencing frequent disruptions. We refer readers
to RFC 7476 − 2.72 [5] which describes Information-centric
Networking: Baseline Scenarios including Emergency Support
and Disaster Recovery. The application of DTN spans across a
wide range of applications such as the Inter-Planetary Network
(IPN), Pocket Switched Networks (PSN), Under Water Net-
works (UWN), Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks now known as the
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) and Internet of Things
(IoT)[6],[7]. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In
Section II, we discuss related work that has been done using
DTN for Post-Disaster scenarios and the various techniques to
mitigate routing misbehaviour in DTN. We present our System
model in III and evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme compared to other existing benchmark schemes in IV.
We conclude the paper in section V and also give an insight
to our future direction.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous Studies have shown that DTNs can provide com-
munication support in disaster relief and rescue operations. An
evaluation carried out by [8] using DTN MapEx a disaster
map generator that operates over a DTN with responders
and volunteers carrying mobile devices shows that DTN can
improve information availability in disaster stricken areas. A
platform of distributed computing over DTN has also been
proposed by [9], this strategy uses task allocation algorithms
based on different connectivity scenarios. This technique relies
on the collaboration among mobile nodes for task allocation
and task monitoring functions. Similarly, a new DTN-based
message relay decision method has been proposed by [10]
for disaster scenarios with unreliable wireless communication
links. Based on their proposed message relay sequence, their
simulation evaluation shows that the proposed method reduces
redundant transmission and effectively improves the message
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delivery ratio. [11] proposes a data aggregation method using
DTN where mobile users create disaster related information
and merge them with their respective coverage areas, this
merging results in duplication of messages and a bloom filter
is introduced to handle each aggregated message.
The process of evacuating disaster victims from the incident
area after a disaster requires the use of a realistic mobility
contact pattern. A related literature in crisis management
investigates a worst case scenario with a few mobile users
available, they evaluate the performance of Epidemic and
HiBOp with special interest in the overhead ratio, latency and
message loss rate. Their evaluation results show that multi-
copy routing protocols perform better than flooding protocols
like Epidemic when the message generated by the node is
more than what the DTN can accommodate based on the
size of the buffer and the bandwidth available [12]. A recent
research work evaluates the performance of different flooding
based routing protocols in a disaster scenario, their results
show that MaxProp and PROPHET have low overheads with
a high replication rate while Epidemic performs better with a
smaller interval rate [13]. Similar research works done have
adopted Epidemic routing for message delivery in intermit-
tently connected networks although these evaluations were not
carried out in emergency scenarios [14],[15]. Vehicular Ad-hoc
Networks (VANET) and Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks
(VDTN) are also used to provide emergency support in disaster
scenarios. The use of Hybrid-DTN as an auxiliary mechanism
in the distribution of warning messages from a control centre
for public safety is proposed by [16]. Similarly, the gathering
of information from the public to the control centre with an
emergency routing scheme which is a directional-based routing
protocol via vehicles to vehicles is proposed by [17].
In mitigating routing misbehaviour and other related at-
tacks, detection and mitigation schemes strategies been pre-
sented by [18],[19]. However,these strategies have not been
tested on Post-disaster mobility models. A few authors
[20],[21],[22],[23] have tried to address packet dropping at-
tacks in emergency networks using DTN. The author in [20]
uses a cooperative scheme obtained from neighbouring nodes
using a Cooperative Faith Value (CFV) with participating
nodes satisfying a predefined threshold condition. In [22], an
observer based reputation technique is used to detect selfish
nodes by observing the behaviour of the relay nodes in a
post disaster communication network using DTN. In a similar
contribution, [21] proposed a Global Reputation Analysis tech-
nique using statistical estimation to determine the reputation
of a node as a healthy forwarder. Their simulation results show
that both schemes identify and exclude selfish and malicious
nodes from participating in a post disaster communication
network.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Mobility Model/Application Scenario
We assume a DTN gateway in Fig.1 provides commu-
nication support from a ground station via a geostationary
satellite while the communication infrastructure is down as
Fig. 1. An Emergency Communication Network
shown in Fig 1. Messages are forward hop-by-hop through
DTN-enabled nodes and for clarity, we set all the messages
to have the same predefined size of 500KB-2MB. It is still
very impractical to allow unlimited delays, therefore we set
the Time-To-Live (TTL) of each packet to 3 hours. Abstract
mobility models such as Random Way Point (RWP) do not
capture well the recurrence inherent in mobility pattern of
the people, object or activities in post disaster scenarios. We
use the Post-Disaster Model 1 (PDM)[5] recommended by
IETF for ICN Baseline scenarios on Disaster Recovery and
Emergency Operations as an extension to ONE [24] simulator
using the Map- Based movement model with four additional
movement classes with some modifications. We model our
disaster scenario based on the terrorist attack at Baga, Borno
State, Nigeria, we model our disaster recovery and evacuation
process using the map in Fig.2 The evacuation process began
two hours after the explosion with emergency responders
equipped with mobile devices with DTN capabilities. The
relief operation begins after the attack, Casualty Collection
Points, Temporary Care Centres and a Health Centre (Point
of Interest POI) are declared as centres that take part in the
evacuation process. These centres are responsible for rescue
and relief operations which involves movement of victims
from the incident area to the evacuation point, giving first aid
treatment to victims that require immediate medical attention.
Fig. 2. Map of Baga, Borno State, Nigeria
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B. Attacker Model
We present an adversary model which is similar to the one
presented by [18]. We consider packet dropping as a mali-
cious misbehaviour exhibited by some emergency responder
nodes. When a malicious node receives a message, it drops
a percentage or all of the packets relayed to it, we consider
(10−50)% of malicious nodes were considered as adversaries.
The main target of the adversary nodes are the application
layer services and data forwarding services in the emergency
communication network. Initiating packet dropping attacks
will disrupt rescue/relief operations and reduce the number
of responder nodes that participate in the evacuation process
of a disaster relief operation.
C. Proposed Strategy
Our proposed Collaborative Trust Management Scheme is
based on the standard watchdog approach in MANETs which
analyses network traffic and detects nodes misbehaviour. A
simple implementation of the watchdog running in a node
overhears the transmitted and received messages by the neigh-
boring nodes, counting the packets that should be received by
each node and computing a trust level for every neighbour
node as the ratio of packets forwarded to the ratio of packets
relayed to it. When a node transmits all the packets forwarded
to it, it will have a trust level of 1. If a node has a trust
level that is lower than the predefined threshold, that node
will be marked as a malicious node. Similar to other Bayesian
approaches, we consider TH=0.7 as our healthy threshold and
blacklist threshold TB=0.3. The main problem of watchdog
systems is that they are characterized by false positive ratios.
Bayesian filters have been proposed to probabilistically esti-
mate the state of a system from noisy operations in MANETs
[25]. The mathematical foundation of the Bayesian filter shows
that at time t, the state of a system is estimated by a random
variable ϑ which is unknown and this is certainly modelled by
assuming that ϑ itself is drawn according to a distribution that
is updated as new encounters become available. To illustrate
this concept, we assume there is a sequence of time-indexed
observations [z1, z2, .zn, zt].The trust composition of belief
TCi is then expressed as posterior density over the random
variable conditioned on all sensor data available at time t.
TC(t)(ϑ) = p(ϑ|z1, z2, zn, zt) = Beta(αt)ϑ) (1)
where the random variable ϑ belongs to the interval [0, 1].
The Bayesian filtering relies on Beta distribution [26] which
belongs to the probabilistic distribution that stretch from 0−1
used to estimate the trust level at this interval. As shown in
equation 2 α represents the contact history of the node towards
an encountered node which is updated as shown in equation
2 where Zt is the information that is obtained at the interval
[t, t+4t] of (CHi→jDirect).
αt + 1 = αt + Zt (2)
Using the Bayesian watchdog as our building block, we im-
plement a Collaborative Trust Management Scheme CTMS.
Similar to the watchdog proposed by [19] for Vehicular DTNs,
our collaborative trust management scheme obtains trust value
from direct and indirect reputations. We consider two phases
in classifying our scheme including the Probe Phase and the
Decision Phase.
1) Probe Phase: In this phase, we consider direct and
indirect encounters based on the contact history. We consider
α as our direct encounter record which contains α(CHi→jDirect),
supposing node IDi=src which is the source node is going to
send a message to node IDdst, the message is stored in a relay
node IDj which will follow a specific forwarding procedure
to relay the message to the next hop. The encounter record
needs to be generated to show the forwarding evidences from
node i→ j. We set the direct encounter record as α and β
respectively. The direct encounter record is expressed as:
α(CHi→jDirect) = [IDi(src), IDj , IDdst,Mttl, Ej , Tenc] (3)
β(CHj→iDirect) = [IDj=src, IDi, IDdst,Mttl, Ej , Tenc] (4)
Where IDi=src is the source node, IDj is the relay node,
IDdst is the destination node for the message delivery, Mttl
is expiration time of the packets, Ej indicates the average
remaining energy of IDj and Tenc is the time stamp and
the sequence number at the time of encounter. During the
encounter, information from encountered nodes by IDi=src
and [IDj=src are used to update each other encounter records
respectively. This information is classified as indirect reputa-
tions δ which represents the degree of trust a node will put on
information from an encounter node within the same network.
To estimate the malicious behaviour of an encountered node,
we use a beta function to obtain the degree of trustworthiness
of a node as shown in equation 3 and 4.
α(CHi→jDirect)
t =
α(CHi→jDirect) + δ.mean(α(CH
j→k
Direct))
2
(5)
β(CHj→iDirect)
t =
β(CHj→iDirect) + δ.mean(β(CH
j→k
Direct))
2
(6)
Where i is the node that is performing the detection, j is the
encountered node,(CHi→jDirect) is the value of α calculated for
every neighbour j of i obtained from direct encounter records
at i, (CHj→kDirect) is the value of α for every encountered node
by j of i that are obtained from the encounter records of
k of j and δ is the degree of trustworthiness from indirect
encounters. Once the reputation for every node has been
obtained, the CTMS obtains the ratio between (CHi→jDirect)
t
and (CHj→iDirect)
t and identifies whether a node is misbehaving.
2) Decision Phase: Once the reputation score has been
obtained from the encountered nodes, the decision module
updates the reputation score based on the predefined tolerance
threshold to identify misbehaving nodes. Our proposed col-
laborative trust model will make appropriate judgments based
on an updated reputation value of the node. An encountered
node whose reputation score is below the tolerance threshold
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is blacklisted and marked as a malicious node. If node i
encounters node j and marks node j as a malicious node, node
i will update information about node j to other encountered
nodes across the network.
IV. PERFORMANCE METRICS AND SIMULATION SETUP
We use the Opportunistic Network Environment simulator
(the ONE) to set up the experiment environments [24], the
ONE has been specifically developed for evaluating DTN
application protocols and routing. In our experiments, we
analyze the impact of blackhole attacks and compare our
proposed approach with the Cooperative Watchdog Scheme
(CWS)proposed by [19] and Spray-and-Wait routing scheme.
We also implement our proposed scheme in a disaster scenario
using the Post Disaster Mobility (PDM) Model 1. The PDM is
recommended by IEFT for Emergency Recovery and Disaster
under ICN baseline scenarios. We validate our preliminary
investigation results through extensive simulations. We con-
duct sufficient simulation runs with disjoint random number
streams to satisfy 5% accuracy and 95% confidence level.
The performance metrics we have considered to evaluate our
proposed system include:
1) Delivery Probability: This is the ratio of the total number
of delivered messages to the total number of messages
created.
DP =
MD
MC
(7)
Where DP is the delivery probability, MD is the total
number of messages delivered and MC is the total
number of created messages.
2) Latency: This is the average delivery delay which is
measured as the average period of time that a message
needs to travel from the source node to the destination
node.
L =
∑MD
i=1 (TMn − TCi)
MD
(8)
In the equation above, TMn is the time when the message
reached its final destination node n, TCi is the time when
the message was created by the source node i and MD
is the total number of messages delivered.
3) Overhead Ratio: The overhead ratio is the measure of the
routing cost of delivering a message from source node to
the destination node. In equation 5 below, we show how
the metric is calculated where RC is the overhead ratio,
MR is the total number of messages relayed and MD is
the number of total number of messages delivered.
RC =
MR −MD
MD
(9)
A. Results and Discussion
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme, the
observed results of the CTMS were compared to CWS and
other routing protocols as explained below:
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Map Area 4800 × 3600 m2
Scenario
Duration
6 hours
No of Nodes 200
TTL (minutes) 180
No of Groups 5 [Rescue workers-100, Patrol team-
20, NGO-10, Ambulance-20, Fire
Service 20]
Area Baga, Borno State, Nigeria
Buffer Size 50MB
Group
Speed(Km/h)
0.5 - 1.5 (Pedestrians) and 2.7-13.9
(Vehicles)
Transmission
Range
100m
1) Impact of Blackhole and Grayhole attacks on message
Delivery Probability: In Fig 3 and 4, we analyse the impacts of
blackhole and grayhole attacks by evaluating the percentage
of the bundles delivered. The CTMS proposed reduces the
negative impact of malicious nodes when compared to the
CWS and Spray-and-Wait considering packet dropping in a
Post-disaster network using DTN. Furthermore, in the worst
case scenario with 50 % of malicious nodes dropping packets,
CTMS outperforms CWS and other routing schemes consid-
ered in the evaluation.
Fig. 3. Impact of Blackhole attacks on Message Delivery
2) Impact of Blackhole and Grayhole attacks on Overhead
Ratio: The routing cost was also evaluated, we observed
from our results that CTMS decreases the message overhead
cost as presented in Fig. 5 and 6. This is as a result of the
trust based forwarding approach used by the CTMS, where
nodes forward messages only to trusted neighbours with high
reputation values. We also compared the performance of our
CTMS with the CWS and Spray-and-Wait. Our results show
that CTMS performs better than the other schemes with an
increase in the number of malicious nodes.
3) Impact of Blackhole and Grayhole attacks on Latency:
In Fig. 7 and 8, we compared the delay in message delivery
of our proposed scheme with the CWS and Spray-and-Wait
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Fig. 4. Impact of Grayhole attacks on Message Delivery
Fig. 5. Impact of Blackhole attacks on Message Overhead
Fig. 6. Impact of Grayhole attacks on Message Overhead
protocols. Our proposed scheme performs better than the
CWS and the Spray-and-Wait as a result of the mobility
pattern of the nodes which enables them to have more inter-
contact times in the between centre movements than the CWS.
Since responders consider the reputation value of nodes to
relay packets, only nodes with reputation values above the
predefined threshold are considered cooperative nodes hence
packets are forwarded to them. In Fig 7 and 8, we also
observed that when 10% of the nodes were malicious, the
average delay for CTMS and CWS were almost the same value
as both schemes use the basic watchdog approach.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a new mitigation scheme
for detecting malicious nodes in DTN. Simulation results
Fig. 7. Impact of Blackhole attacks on Message Latency
Fig. 8. Impact of Grayhole attacks on Message Latency
show that our proposed scheme (CTMS) can mitigate routing
misbehaviour such as packet dropping. We considered the
problems associated with providing communication support
when the telecommunication infrastructure is damaged or
unavailable. We proposed the use of DTN for communications
in emergency support services. We investigated the use of
DTN in disaster relief and rescue operations and our results
show that DTNs can provide resilient communication support
for evacuation in a post-disaster scenario. We evaluated an
existing mitigation scheme (CWS) for node misbehaviour and
compared the results to our proposed CTMS. Our proposed
scheme is able to detect and exclude malicious nodes from the
network and our results show that CTMS performs better than
other routing schemes considering the number of messages
delivered, average delay, overhead ratio of the message and the
number of messages dropped by intermediary nodes relaying
the messages. In our future work, we will look at enhancement
of CTMS to mitigate cooperative attacks carried by a group
of nodes with predefined healthy thresholds that collaborate to
drop packets relayed to them.
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